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2004 Miranda "Poisoned Fruit" Cases
Yale Kamisar
Some months after I finished writing an article that, inter alia, discussed the
lower court opinions in Patane and Seibert (an article that appears elsewhere in
this issue of the Journa),1 the Supreme Court handed down its decisions in those
cases. 2 In Patane, a 5-4 majority held admissible a Glock pistol located as a result
of a failure to comply with Miranda. In Seibert, a 5-4 majority agreed with the
state court that a "second confession," one obtained after the police had
deliberately used a two-stage interrogation technique designed to undermine the
Miranda warnings, was inadmissible.
3
In Patane, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer,
dissented. In Seibert, Justice Souter, joined by the three Patane dissenters, wrote
the principal opinion. The Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and
Thomas would have admitted the evidence in both cases. Therefore, the lineup in
both cases was the same except for Justice Kennedy. He sided with the
prosecution in Patane, but with the defense in Seibert.
I. UNITED STATES v. PATANE
As I feared,4 Justice Thomas, who wrote the three-person plurality opinion in
Patane,5 relied heavily on Chavez v. Martinez.6 He maintained that since "a mere
failure to give Miranda warnings does not, by itself, violate a suspect's
constitutional rights or even the Miranda rule," 7 no violation of Miranda or the
Constitution occurred in Patane-at least no "completed" violation-and thus,
Professor of Law, University of San Diego; Clarence Darrow Distinguished University
Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan.
I See Yale Kamisar, A Look Back on a Half-Century of Teaching, Writing and Speaking
About Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 69 (2004).
2 See United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004); Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601
(2004).
3 For a discussion of the lower court opinions in these cases, see Kamisar, supra note 1, at
83-84.
4 See id. at 82.
5 Justice Thomas was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia. Justice Kennedy, joined
by Justice O'Connor, concurred in the judgment.
6 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
7 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2626 (emphasis added).
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"there is . . . nothing to deter." 8 However, Thomas's reliance on Martinez is
misplaced.
The person who brought the § 1983 action in Martinez was never criminally
prosecuted. Therefore no improperly obtained evidence-direct or derivative-
was ever "used" against him. In Patane, on the other hand, the failure to comply
with the Miranda rules did not stand "by itself'; it produced the evidence that was
"used" against the defendant-the Glock pistol. And for more than a hundred
years, it has been clear that the privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the
derivative use, as well as the direct use, of compelled utterances. 9
"Potential violations [of a suspect's constitutional rights or the Miranda rule]
occur, if at all," asserts Justice Thomas, "only upon the admission of unwamed
statements into evidence at trial."' 0  I must say that this is a confusing and
misleading assertion.
Potential violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause take place upon the
admission at trial of compelled statements or evidence (physical or otherwise)
derived from such statements. Until the Court told us otherwise in Patane, the
same could have been plausibly said for physical evidence derived from unwarned
but presumptively compelled statements-presumptively compelled because
obtained in violation of the Miranda rules.
Indeed, during the Patane oral arguments, when the Chief Justice suggested
that Chavez v. Martinez was dispositive because, adding up all the votes in the
various opinions written in that case, there were six votes for the proposition "that
the Constitution was not violated by [a] failure to give [the] Miranda warnings
until [the statements] were offered in evidence,"" Deputy Solicitor General
Michael Dreeben felt the need to point out that Chavez v. Martinez "alone does not
decide this case":
[T]he reason.., is that the Court has, in instances of actual compulsion
out of court, applied a derivative evidence suppression rule. That's the
rule that the Court adopted in Counselman v. Hitchcock, and it [has]
followed [that rule] in its immunity line of cases where it has held that
[in order to satisfy] the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination, you need to suppress both the statement and the fruits.' 2
' Id. at2629.
9 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); see also Robert M. Pitler, "The Fruit
of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CAL. L. REv. 579, 619-20, 650 (1968). See
generally the discussion in Kamisar, supra note 1, at 84-94.
10 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2629.
11 Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004) (No.
02-1183).
12 Id. at 15. At another point in the Patane oral arguments, see id. at 7, the Deputy Solicitor
General conceded that if, in response to a grand jury subpoena, a person under threat of contempt of
court revealed the existence of a gun, the weapon, as well as the statement, would not be admissible.
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The Patane plurality opinion tells us-and it does so as many as four times-
that "[t]he Self Incrimination Clause, however, is not implicated by the admission
into evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement."
1 3
This strikes me as a peculiarly worded comment. One who reads it quickly
might think that the plurality is saying that the reach of the Self-Incrimination
Clause does not extend to the "physical" or "nontestimonial" fruit of a confession.
But a second look makes it clear that that is not what the plurality is saying. The
operative phrase is not "the physical or nontestimonial fruit," but "a voluntary
statement." And, of course, the Self-Incrimination Clause is not implicated by the
admission into evidence of anything that is the fruit of "a voluntary statement."
The question presented in Patane was whether, for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment's ban against the use of evidence derived from compelled statements
(or, if one prefers, for purposes of the "poisoned fruit" doctrine), a statement
obtained without giving the requisite warnings should be treated as a compelled
statement or a voluntary one. Once you assume that statements obtained as a result
of a failure to comply with the Miranda rules are "voluntary"-just as "voluntary"
for derivative evidence or tainted fruit purposes, for example, as a statement
volunteered by someone not in police custody-the analysis is over. You have
assumed the answer to the question presented.
But why lump together (a) statements obtained without satisfying the
Miranda rule and (b) what might be called purely or completely voluntary
statements? Instead of putting the Miranda-deficient statements under the heading
"Voluntary Statements," why not classify them under the heading "Compelled,
Coerced and Presumptively Compelled Statements"?
After all, at the very least a statement obtained from a custodial suspect who
was not given the requisite Miranda warnings is presumptively coerced. As
Justice Thomas himself observes in Patane, "[t]o protect against [the] danger" that
"the possibility of coercion inherent in custodial interrogation" might cause "a
suspect's privilege against self-incrimination ... [to] be violated," "the Miranda
rule creates a presumption of coercion, in the absence of specific warnings, that is
generally irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution's case in chief.'
14
At one point, Justice Thomas informs us that "the Self-Incrimination Clause
contains its own exclusionary rule" and that, unlike the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule, "the Self-Incrimination Clause is self-executing."1 5 The Fifth
Amendment certainly does have its own "exclusionary rule." Moreover, as noted
'3 124 S. Ct. at 2626 (first full paragraph); see also id. at 2626 (second full paragraph) ("The
Clause cannot be violated by the introduction of nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of
voluntary statements"); id. at 2624 ("the Miranda rule protects against violations of the Self-
Incrimination Clause, which, in turn, is not implicated by the introduction at trial of physical
evidence resulting from voluntary statements"); id. at 2630 ("Introduction of the nontestimonial fruit
of a voluntary statement, such as respondent's Glock, does not implicate the Self-Incrimination
Clause").
14 Id. at 2627.
'5 Id. at 2628.
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earlier, 16 Counselman v. Hitchcock held that the Fifth Amendment protects a
witness against the derivative use of his compelled testimony, thus invoking what
has come to be known as the poisonous tree doctrine. (And Counselman did so
decades before the doctrine had ever been utilized or articulated in a search and
seizure case).17
Justice Thomas does not deny that the Self-Incrimination Clause has its own
"fruits" doctrine. The Court has "repeatedly explained," he observes, "that those
subjected to coercive police interrogations have an automatic protection from the
use of their involuntary statements (or evidence derived from their statements) in
any subsequent trial."'
' 8
But then Thomas's reasoning takes what strikes me as a strange turn: "This
explicit textual protection," he concludes, "supports a strong presumption against
expanding the Miranda rule any further."' 19
Why doesn't what Justice Thomas calls the "explicit textual protection" of the
Fifth Amendment (I take it he means that the "exclusionary rule" and the "fruits"
doctrine are explicit in the text of the Fifth Amendment) cut the other way? Cut in
favor of excluding evidence derived from a Miranda deficient statement?
Justice Thomas's reasoning becomes still more puzzling when one recalls that
he joined Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Dickerson. On that occasion,
Justice Scalia maintained that unless one agreed with the Elstad Court that
"Miranda violations are not constitutional violations" 21 (a view Scalia and Thomas
share, but the Dickerson majority rejected), it would be hard to explain why the
"'fruits' doctrine" applies to the fruits of illegal searches but not to the fruits of
16 See supra text accompanying note 9.
17 As I have said elsewhere:
If, as the search and seizure cases seem to say, the poisonous tree doctrine is the corollary
of an exclusionary rule, why shouldn't the Fifth Amendment have its own poisonous tree
doctrine? After all, the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-
incrimination "is an exclusionary rule-and a constitutionally created one." Moreover,
"unlike the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment is directly concerned with the
introduction of tainted evidence at trial; it is in fact the introduction of such evidence that
constitutes the primary violation of the Amendment."
Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions and Compelled
Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REv. 929, 987 (1995). The first quotation is from Alan M. Dershowitz &
John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the
Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1214 (1971). The second quotation is from Note,
Standards for Exclusion in Immunity Cases after Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J. 171, 178
(1972).
18 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628 (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003))
(emphasis added).
19 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628 (emphasis added).
20 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (striking down a federal statute
purporting to abolish Miranda because "Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions
interpreting and applying the Constitution").
21 Id. at 455 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Miranda violations "since it is not clear on the face of the Fourth Amendment that
evidence obtained in violation of that guarantee must be excluded from trial,
whereas it is clear on the face of the Fifth Amendment that unconstitutionally
compelled confessions cannot be used.,
22
Moving on to another point, Justice Thomas twice cites United States v.
Hubbell23 for the proposition that the word "witness" in the Self-Incrimination
Clause "limits the relevant category of compelled incriminating communications to
those that are 'testimonial' in character." 24  Once again, this statement is
misleading, or at least confusing. Hubbell does not say that in order for the Self-
Incrimination Clause to be implicated the evidence ultimately acquired and offered
in evidence must be "'testimonial' in character"-only that the initial act in the
chain of events that led to the proffered evidence must be "testimonial" (as Mr.
Patane's statement revealing where his Glock pistol was hidden certainly was).25
Justice Thomas's reference to Hubbell is puzzling because that case cuts the
other way. The opinion of the Court in Hubbell emphasizes that the fact that the
evidence ultimately obtained and offered at the trial is "physical" or
"nontestimonial" does not insulate it from the effects of a prior testimonial act,
such as a coerced confession or compelled statement-the use of the physical
evidence is still the prohibited use of evidence derived from the compelled
statements.26
22 Id. at 455; see also The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 222 (1968):
Unlike the search and seizure "fruits" doctrine, which was established to further the
deterrent rationale underlying the exclusion of the primary evidence itself, "the fifth
amendment exclusionary rule is an essential element of the constitutional right, not just a
means of enforcing the right."
23 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
24 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2626 (quoting Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 34); see also id. at 2630 (quoting
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 34-35) ("[W]e have held that '[t]he word 'witness' in the constitutional text
limits the' scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause to testimonial evidence.").
25 As the Hubbell Court explained, the Fifth Amendment is not implicated, "even though the
act may provide incriminating evidence, [when] a criminal suspect [is] compelled to put on a shirt, to
provide a blood sample or handwriting exemplar, or to make a recording of his voice." 530 U.S. at
35. These are all nontestimonial acts.
26 See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 37-39:
[A] half-century ago... we explained:
"The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves
support a conviction.., but likewise embraces those which would furnish a
link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal
crime." Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). Compelled
testimony that communicates information that may "lead to incriminating
evidence" is privileged even if the information is not inculpatory. It is the
Fifth Amendment's protection against the prosecutor's use of incriminating
information derived directly or indirectly from the compelled testimony of
the respondent that is of primary relevance in this case. (emphasis added)...
. [In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972), upholding a federal
immunity statute,] we stressed the importance of [the statute's] "explicit
2004]
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At one point, Justice Thomas concedes that "the physical fruit of actually
coerced statements" must be excluded,27 but he does not seem to realize the full
significance of that concession. It is not at all clear (and Justice Thomas does
nothing to make it clear) why the specific language in the text of the Fifth
Amendment constitutes an impenetrable barrier to the exclusion of physical
evidence obtained from someone in Mr. Patane's circumstances, but is inoperative
when the issue presented is the admissibility of the same kind of evidence derived
from statements obtained in violation of "the core protection" afforded by the Fifth
Amendment.28
Why do the words of the Fifth Amendment-"compell[ing]" a person "to be a
witness against himself'--dictate the outcome in a case like Patane (according to
the Thomas plurality), when the police fail to comply with a rule based on the Fifth
Amendment and designed to implement it, but simply disappear when we deal
with a more direct infringement of the Fifth Amendment? 29 In both instances we
are talking about the same amendment, are we not?
proscription" of the use in any criminal case of "'testimony or other
information compelled under the order (or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)."' We
particularly emphasized the critical importance of protection against a future
prosecution based on knowledge and sources of information obtained from
the compelled testimony. Id. at 454.
Id.
27 See Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2630 (emphasis added). Although it is often said and widely
assumed that this is the rule, so far as I can tell the admissibility of physical evidence derived from a
coerced confession is an issue that, surprisingly, the Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed.
For a discussion of various possible reasons why the Court has not done so, see Kamisar, supra note
17, at 990-1004.
28 Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2626 (plurality opinion); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309
(1985) ("If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda
procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the
Fifth Amendment itself.") (emphasis added).
29 Early in the Patane oral arguments, there was an interesting exchange between Justice
Scalia and the Solicitor General Office's premier criminal procedure lawyer, Michael Dreeben.
When Mr. Dreeben described Miranda as "a rule that implements the Fifth Amendment . . . by
providing an extra level of protection for the core of the Fifth Amendment right," Transcript of Oral
Argument at 4, United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004) (No. 02-1183), Justice Scalia asked
him whether or not Miranda was "a Fifth Amendment right." Id. Justice Scalia pressed Mr. Dreeben
on this point, perhaps because he was annoyed that four years earlier, in Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428 (2000), the Solicitor General's office had refused to defend the constitutionality of a
federal statute purporting to abolish Miranda in federal cases.
In light of Dickerson, Mr. Dreeben had to say that Miranda was a constitutional right. In order
to win his case, however, Dreeben had to argue that a violation of the Miranda rule was something
significantly less than a violation of the core of the Self-Incrimination Clause itself. Mr. Dreeben
conceded that if the pistol had been found as the result of a "core" violation of the Self-Incrimination
Clause, it would have had to have been excluded. Not surprisingly, Dreeben told the Court that
Miranda "is a constitutional right" but one "distinct from the right not to have one's compelled
statements used against oneself." Id. at 5.
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"The admission of such fruit [as Mr. Patane's Glock pistol]," Justice Thomas
assures us, "presents no risk that a defendant's coerced statements (however
defined) will be used against him at a criminal trial. 3 ° In any event, he adds,
"'[t]he exclusion of unwarned statements.., is a complete and sufficient remedy'
for any perceived Miranda violation.,
3
'
Justice Thomas never explains, however, why the Glock pistol would be
excluded if it were the fruit of a coerced confession (or compelled testimony). Nor
does he explain why the exclusion of the coerced confession without more would
not be "a complete and sufficient remedy" for a coerced confession that produced a
Glock pistol.
Justice Thomas does assert that "statements taken without sufficient Miranda
warnings are presumed to have been coerced ... only when necessary to protect
the privilege against self-incrimination. 3 2  But he does not tell us why it is
necessary to exclude a Glock found as the result of a coerced confession (or
compelled testimony) but not one found as the result of a failure to comply with
the Miranda rules. Why doesn't the rationale for the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine apply in both instances?
Why would we exclude the physical fruits of coerced confessions-or the
coerced confessions themselves, for that matter-when, checked with external
evidence, statements contained in them are independently established as true?
Because, as the Court told us in Spano v. New York,33 the ban against the use of
coerced confessions turns not only on their possible unreliability but on the notion
that "the police must obey the law while enforcing the law."
34
Mr. Dreeben went on to say that "Miranda addressed [ ] a situation in which it was extremely
difficult for the courts to sort out whether a statement was coerced or not coerced, and [that Miranda
was designed] to avoid the risk that an actually coerced statement would be used in evidence against
the defendant, thus violating the core Fifth Amendment right." Id. at 6.
30 124 S. Ct. at 2630.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959) (Warren, C.J.).
34 Id. The most emphatic articulation of the view that untrustworthiness is not, or at least is
no longer, the principal reason for excluding a coerced or involuntary confession is probably Justice
Frankfurter's opinion for a 7-2 majority in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). In that case, in
the course of overturning the conviction, Justice Frankfurter emphasized that "a legal standard which
took into account the circumstances of [a confession's] probable truth or falsity" did not satisfy due
process. Id. at 543. Justice Frankfurter also pointed out:
[Convictions based on coerced confessions cannot stand] not because such confessions
are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying
principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is as accusatorial and not an
inquisitorial system .... [In many of the cases in which the command of the Due
Process Clause has compelled us to reverse state convictions involving the use of
confessions obtained by impermissible methods, independent corroborating evidence left
little doubt of what the defendant had confessed. Despite such verification, confessions
were found to be the product of constitutionally impermissible methods in their
inducement.
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And why do we throw out the physical fruits of coerced confessions as well as
the confessions themselves? Presumably because, as the Court told us in Nardone
v. United States,35 the first case to use the phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree," to
forbid the direct use of police methods but to put no curb on their indirect use
would only "invite" the very methods we disapprove and want to discourage.
Doesn't the Court care that when the police fail to administer the Miranda
warnings to custodial suspects, they are disobeying the law while enforcing it?
Doesn't the Court care that when the prosecution is allowed to use the physical
fruits of police failures to comply with the Miranda rules, they "invite" the police
to turn their backs on Miranda?
36
At one point during the oral arguments in Patane, Justice Ginsburg asked the
Deputy Solicitor General the following question:
This was a case where [the] crime that the police were after ... was gun
possession. It might be narcotics possession; it might be stolen goods.
And in all those situations, are you saying that the constitutional rule is
Id. at 540-41.
As observed in 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 6.2(b), at 445 (2d ed. 1999), "Rogers thus made certain what had been strongly
intimated in several earlier cases . . . , namely, that the due process exclusionary rule for confessions
(in much the same way as the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for physical evidence) is also
intended to deter improper police conduct." See also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 23.02[B], at 442-43 (3d ed. 2002); WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CONVERGING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES 6, 10-11 (1967) (the text of
lectures delivered shortly before Miranda was handed down); CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD &
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS § 16.02(3),
at 407 (4th ed. 2000); Francis A. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of
Criminal Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 213, 235 (1959); Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and
Confession, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 957 (1997); Monrad G. Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and
the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411, 429 (1954); Roger J. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in
Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 666 (1966) (pre-Miranda).
" 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.).
36 As David A. Wollin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda Violations Bear Fruit?, 53 OHIO
ST. L.J. 805, 845 (1992), has pointed out, "Expert interrogators have long recognized, and continue to
instruct, that a confession is a primary source for determining the existence and whereabouts of the
fruits of a crime, such as documents or weapons." Shortly after Miranda was handed down and long
before the Supreme Court had occasion to address the specific issue, Pitler, supra note 9, at 620,
warned: "[I]f the police were permitted to utilize illegally obtained confessions for links and leads
rather than being required to gather evidence independently, then the Miranda warnings would be of
no value in protecting the privilege against self-incrimination."
Consider, too, the comments of B. James George, Jr., Fruits of the Poisonous Tree: What's
In-What's Out, in A NEw LOOK AT CONFESSIONS: ESCOBEDO-THE SECOND ROUND 121-22 (B.
James George, Jr. ed., 1967) (transcript of conference held during the summer following the Miranda
decision). Professor George noted that "what data there are suggest" that "obtain[ing] leads from a
suspect on the basis of which they can discover real or demonstrative evidence, or identify
prosecution witnesses... is usually more important to law enforcement" than "obtain[ing] statements
that they can later present in court," but indicated that this was a reason for admitting the fruits of
Miranda-deficient statements, not excluding them.
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that a police chief can say to his officers, go in and get [the suspect] to
tell you where the narcotics are, where the gun is, where the stolen goods
are? We don't worry about his statement, but we want the goods.37
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben's answer was "that is my position," but he
did not think "it would be a prudent policy for law enforcement to adopt." 38 Why
not? Because, Mr. Dreeben explained, many suspects waive their rights, and what
if a suspect advised of his rights waives them and "offers up information that is
incriminating [about] unanticipated crimes or provides leads to information that the
police haven't previously anticipated"? 39 Secondly, by failing to administer the
warnings the police "increase the likelihood that a later court ... will conclude that
this.., is a case involving actual compulsion.
'AO
The second argument strikes me as quite weak. It takes a great deal more to
establish that a confession is coerced than a mere failure to administer the Miranda
warnings. The first argument is more substantial. Mr. Patane's interrogators did
have something to lose by failing to give him the Miranda warnings. But it is
highly unlikely that any member of the Patane majority would have changed his or
her vote if the failure to satisfy the Miranda rule were such that the police had
nothing to lose by refusing to comply with Miranda.
Consider, for example, a situation where the suspect has invoked his right to
counsel, but the police continue to question him in order to retrieve the murder
weapon or some other nontestimonial evidence.4' In this set of circumstances the
police have nothing to lose by rejecting the request for counsel (they will lose any
statement the suspect might make, but they would have lost any statement anyway
if they had honored the suspect's request for counsel and immediately ceased all
questioning) and something to gain (the use of physical evidence that the
inadmissible statement might turn up). I do not deny that the Court could and
42
should distinguish the hypothetical case from the Patane case. I am only saying
that the present Court is highly unlikely to do so.
37 Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11, United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004) (No.
02-1183).
38 Id. at 11.
'9 Id. at 12.
40 id.
41 In the police training tape discussed in Kamisar, supra note 1, at 94, and quoted at
considerable length in Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 109, 189
(1998), the deputy district attorney tells police officers that when a "Mirandized" suspect invokes his
rights they can go "outside Miranda," i.e., continue to talk to him: "[H]e's invoked Miranda and you
say, 'Well, I'd still like to find the evidence in the case.' So you go 'outside Miranda' . . . and then
he tells you where the stuff is, we can go and get all that evidence." Weisselberg, supra, at 190.
42 The hypothetical case should be distinguished from Patane because rejecting a suspect's
request for counsel is a more serious failure to comply with Miranda-and more likely to be a
deliberate failure-than not giving a custodial suspect a full set of warnings. Moreover, excluding
only the statement obtained by questioning someone who has asked for a lawyer, but not the physical
20041 105
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The Patane plurality does say at the outset that the question presented is
"whether a failure to give a suspect the warnings prescribed by Miranda requires
suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect's unwarned but voluntary
statements, '' 3 but the main themes of the plurality opinion are that the Self-
Incrimination Clause is not implicated by the admission of the physical fruit of a
statement that is not actually compelled; violations of Miranda occur-or are
"completed"--only upon the admission at trial of the Miranda-deficient
statements; and the word "witness" in the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause
limits the scope of the Clause to testimonial evidence.
"Unlike the plurality," the concurring justices (Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice O'Connor) found it "unnecessary to decide whether the detective's failure
to give Patane the full Miranda warnings should be characterized as a violation of
the Miranda rule itself, or whether there is 'anything to deter' so long as the
unwarned statements are not later introduced at trial. '44 But the concurring justices
do make plain their approval of Oregon v. Elstad,45 which admitted a "second
confession" or "successive confession" (one obtained after a suspect has been
questioned in successive unwarned and warned phases and confesses during both
phases).46 And they also make clear their belief that the case for admitting the
physical fruits of a Miranda failure is stronger than the case for admitting a second
confession:
Here . the Government presents an even stronger case for admitting
the evidence obtained as the result of Patane's unwarned statement.
Admission of nontestimonial physical fruits (the Glock in this case),
even more so than the postwaming statements to the police in Elstad...
does not run the risk of admitting into trial an accused's coerced
incriminating statements against himself. In light of the important
probative value of reliable physical evidence, it is doubtful that exclusion
can be justified by a deterrence rationale sensitive to both law
enforcement interests and a suspect's rights during an in-custody
interrogation.47
On the question whether, for "poisoned fruit" or "derivative evidence"
purposes, failures to administer the Miranda warnings should be distinguished
evidence the statement produced, is a woefully weak sanction in a situation where the police have
nothing to lose by continuing to question the suspect, but something to gain (the physical evidence).
41 124 S. Ct. at 2624.
44 Id. at 2631.
41 See id. at 2630-31 (discussing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)).
46 See the discussion in Kamisar, supra note 1, at 88-94.
41 124 S. Ct. at 2631 (Kennedy, J., concurring). But see supra text at notes 33-34 and
authorities quoted and cited in note 34.
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from failures to honor a suspect's assertion of his Miranda rights, the Court's
"Miranda impeachment" cases are instructive.
In Harris v. New York,48 the Burger Court struck its first blow at Miranda,
ruling that statements preceded by defective warnings, and thus inadmissible to
establish the prosecution's case-in-chief, could nevertheless be used to impeach the
defendant's credibility if he chose to take the stand in his own defense. Four years
later, the Court went a step further in Oregon v. Hass.49
In Hass, after being advised of his rights, the defendant asserted them. The
police refused to honor the defendant's request for a lawyer and continued to
question him. The Court held that on these facts, too, the resulting statements
could be used for impeachment purposes.
In Hass, the defense argued that, unlike the situation in the earlier Harris
case, when a suspect asserts his rights the police have nothing to lose and
something to gain (the use of statements for impeachment purposes) by continuing
to question him; therefore, permitting the police to use the statements would take
away any incentive for following Miranda. The state supreme court had found this
argument convincing. So did the two dissenters (Justice Brennan, joined by
Marshall, J.). But a 6-2 majority, per Justice Blackmun, was unmoved by "[t]his
speculative possibility."5°  "[T]he balance was struck in Harris," maintained
Blackmun, "and we are not disposed to change it now.
5 1
II. MISSOURI v. SEIBERT
Although the prosecution prevailed in Patane, the evidence derived from a
failure to comply with Miranda, a so-called second confession, was held
inadmissible in Missouri v. Seibert52 (a companion case to Patane). The fact
situation in Seibert, however, was quite extreme:
The officer involved had "resort[ed] to an interrogation technique he had been
taught., 53 At the first questioning session he had made "a 'conscious decision' to
withhold Miranda wamings ' 54 and, after obtaining incriminating statements, had
called a short recess (twenty minutes) before resuming the questioning. At the
outset of the second session the officer did advise the suspect of her rights, and did
obtain a waiver, but he then confronted the suspect with the statements she had
made during the first session (when she had not been warned of her rights). Not
48 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
4' 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
50 Id. at 723.
51 Id.
52 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
5' Id. at 2606.
54 id.
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surprisingly, the suspect confessed again. The new statement was "'largely a
repeat of information.. . obtained' prior to the warning.
55
The failure to comply with Miranda was so deliberate and so flagrant that an
8-1 or 7-2 ruling in favor of the defense would not have been surprising. The fact
that the vote on these extreme facts was 5-4 and that the derivative evidence was
held inadmissible only because of Justice Kennedy's somewhat grudging
concurring opinion is significant evidence of the low state to which Miranda has
fallen.
Although he concurred in the judgment, Justice Kennedy praised Elstad56-
which informed us that "a subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a
suspect who has given ...[an] unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to
remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement" 57-and he
left no doubt that in the typical "second confession" case he would admit the
evidence.5 8 At one point he maintained that "to treat the presence of one statement
that cannot be admitted under Miranda as sufficient reason to prohibit subsequent
statements preceded by a proper warning ... would be extravagant."5 9
Although he voted to exclude the second confession because the two-stage
interrogation technique used in the case "undermines the Miranda warning and
obscures its meaning, ' 6° Justice Kennedy indicated that he might very well have
voted the other way if one or more "curative measures" had been taken.61 He
pointed out, for example, that "a substantial break in time and circumstances
between the prewarning statement and the Miranda warning may suffice in most
circumstances. 62
Although a future Court might be impressed with a two or three hour recess
between the first and second questioning session, rather than a twenty-minute
break, I am not at all sure that it would really make any difference. One might
argue that during a longer recess the impact of the unwarned incriminating
statement might "wear off." But it strikes me that one could argue just as plausibly
that during a longer recess the impact of the earlier statements might "sink in" and
the suspect might become quite distressed about having become, or been made to
be, the "deluded instrument of his own conviction. 63 Nor is it plain to me that
55 Id.; see also the discussion in Kamisar, supra note 1, at 92.
56 See 124 S. Ct. at 2615, 2616.
5' Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added).
" See 124 S. Ct. at 2616.
59 Id. at 2615.
60 Id. at 2614.
61 Seeid. at 2616.
62 Id.
63 See Pitler, supra note 9, at 618:
Miranda was predicated on the absence of prior unlawful police activity which would
pressure the accused to waive his rights or cause the court to lose confidence in police
warnings .... An "admissibility" warning by the police after an initial [unwarned]
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replacing the officer who presided at the first questioning session with a new
police officer would have much of an ameliorative effect.
I think it fairly clear from his concurring opinion, however, that if Ms.
Seibert's interrogator had arranged for a two or three hour recess rather than a
twenty-minute break, and the second questioning session had gotten under way
with a new police officer in charge, and the new officer had been careful not to
refer specifically to the prewarning statement, Justice Kennedy would have voted
in favor of admitting the evidence. It remains to be seen whether, after Seibert, the
police will continue to use a modified version of the two-step questioning
technique, what "curative measures" they will adopt and how the courts will
respond.
Justice Kennedy also pointed out that "[a]lternatively, an additional warning
that explains the likely inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial statement may
be sufficient." 64 However, two decades ago, in Elstad, the Court rather
peremptorily dismissed the suggestion that when an unwamed statement is
obtained and the police resume questioning the suspect should be given, in
addition to the standard Miranda warning, a supplementary warning that the earlier
statement is not admissible (or at least that it may not be):
Such a requirement is neither practicable nor constitutionally necessary.
In many cases, a breach of Miranda procedures may not be identified as
such until long after full Miranda warnings are administered and a valid
confession obtained. The standard Miranda warnings explicitly inform
the suspect of his right to consult a lawyer before speaking. Police
officers are ill-equipped to pinch-hit for counsel, construing the murky
and difficult questions of when "custody" begins or whether a given
unwarned statement will ultimately be held admissible.65
confession, absent consultation with a lawyer, would have a negligible impact on the
suspect. And the opportunity for [a second chance to obtain an admissible confession]
would only serve to discourage compliance with Miranda [the first time in order] to
facilitate procurement of a second confession.
Id.
64 124 S. Ct. at 2616. Justice Souter, author of the principal opinion in Seibert, was careful to
note that:
[w]e do not hold that a formal addendum warning that a previous statement could not be
used would be sufficient to change the character of the question-first procedure to the
point of rendering an ensuing statement admissible, but its absence is clearly a factor that
blunts the efficacy of the warnings and points to a continuing, not a new interrogation.
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612 n.7.
65 470 U.S. at 316-17. However, the Court never explicitly considered the possibility that if
the police are "ill equipped" (or unwilling) to tell the person who has made an unwamed statement
that that statement may be inadmissible or even that it is unclear whether the earlier statement is
admissible, we should require them to let defense counsel do so.
2004]
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Ironically, the occasion when the police are most likely to know that the
unwarned statement obtained during the first questioning session is inadmissible is
when they deliberately withheld the Miranda warnings during the first session.
But if the police really believed (as they expect the rest of us to believe) that a
fresh set of Miranda warnings, plus an additional warning explaining the likely
inadmissibility of the earlier unwarned statement, would completely "cure"
everything and restore the suspect to exactly the same position he would have been
in had he never made the earlier unwarned statement, what do the police gain by
deliberately withholding the warnings in the first place and giving the Miranda
warnings and the supplementary warning later? Wouldn't it be a good deal
simpler just to give the appropriate warnings in thefirst place?
A final point about Seibert: The four dissenters (Justice O'Connor, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas) seem to say that if the
suspect is unaware of the deliberate or flagrant nature of the police misconduct, the
deliberate and flagrant nature is irrelevant.66 But the issue in Seibert was not the
extent to which the suspect was actually coerced or how much pain and suffering
he experienced, but whether, considering the particular circumstances, it was
necessary or appropriate to exclude the evidence derived from a failure to comply
with Miranda. And in determining whether exclusion is necessary or appropriate,
"the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an important step in the
calculus. ' 67 This is so whether or not the victim of the police misconduct is fully
aware of the magnitude of the misconduct.
Suppose, for example, that after a highly publicized murder the police "round
up" 100 people, take them to the station house and question them. Some of the
people unlawfully arrested may have no idea that anybody else was arrested and
taken to the police station for the same crime-let alone that ninety-nine other
people were "rounded up." But that has, or at least should have, no bearing on the
purposefulness and flagrancy of the police misconduct.
Similarly, the fact that Ms. Seibert was unaware that the officer had made a
conscious decision to withhold the Miranda warnings during the first questioning
session does not make the officer's failure to give the warnings any less
purposeful. Nor does the fact that Ms. Seibert failed to realize how she was being
manipulated when the officer confronted her with the unwarned statement she had
uttered earlier make the police tactic any less a flagrant failure to comply with
Miranda.
When the officer foresees the challenged derivative evidence as a probable
product of his deliberate failure to comply with Miranda, the exclusion of the
derivative evidence is especially appropriate. Since the purpose of the Miranda
exclusionary rule, as well as other exclusionary rules, is to discourage undesirable
66 See 124 S. Ct. at 2617-18.
67 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984); cf Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-
04 (1975) ("[I]n determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest," a
number of factors are relevant, "particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.").
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police conduct, "where that conduct is particularly offensive [as it was in Seibert,]
the deterrence ought to be greater and, therefore, the scope of exclusion broader."
68
III. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
I have no doubt that if the case had come before the Supreme Court a short
time after Miranda was decided, the Court would have thrown out the fruits of a
deliberate failure to comply with Miranda whether or not the fruits were
"testimonial." Moreover, I have little doubt that if the case had arisen a short time
after Miranda, and if the admissibility of a "second confession" were at issue, the
Court would have excluded the confession regardless of whether the break
between the first and second questioning session was twenty minutes, two hours,
or four. Finally, I have little doubt that if the case had arisen a short time after
Miranda, the Court would even have excluded the fruits of a negligent failure to
comply with Miranda as well as a deliberate one.69
However, as a Justice Department lawyer delicately put it during the oral
arguments in Patane, "there are many things in the Miranda opinion that have not
stood the test of later litigation in this Court.,
70
The heading of the New York Times article on the rulings in Patane and
Seibert was that the Supreme Court had barred the "delayed Miranda warning
tactic.' The lead paragraph informed us that the Court had "rejected a police
interrogation tactic designed to induce suspects to give incriminating statements
after purposely delaying Miranda warnings., 72 This is correct as far as it goes, but
one taking a "wide angle view" of the two Miranda "poisoned fruit" cases might
well have chosen a different heading and a different lead, such as:
"The Court barred the use of a particular interrogation technique designed to
circumvent Miranda-deliberately delaying the giving of the now familiar
68 Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea for Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REv.
1136, 1150-51 (1967), quoted with approval in 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J.
KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.3(c), at 348 (2d ed. 1999).
69 Indeed, I said as much, and at some length, the year Miranda was handed down. See
George, supra note 36, at 147-51 (transcript of conference held in the summer following the Miranda
decision) (remarks of Yale Kamisar). But see remarks of B. James George, Jr., id. at 121-24.
70 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004) (No. 02-
1183). The lawyer, Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben, was responding to the following
statement by Justice Ginsburg:
Miranda itself said, [that] unless [the requisite] warnings and waivers are demonstrated
by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used
against him, no evidence as a result of interrogation. That sounds like ... a derivative
evidence rule to me.
Id. at 7-8.
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warnings-but made it fairly clear that in the great bulk of cases the so-called
'derivative evidence' or 'poisoned fruit' doctrines will not prevent the police from
getting around Miranda."
First of all, it is plain that the Court will admit the "second confession" in
cases where a police officer has not admitted, and it cannot otherwise be
established, that he made a conscious decision to withhold the Miranda warnings.
(This is essentially the Elstad case all over again.) And, as Judge Ebel, who wrote
the lower court opinion in Patane, observed, "[e]ven in cases where the failure to
administer Miranda warnings was calculated, obtaining evidence of such
deliberate violations of Miranda often would be difficult or impossible. 73
Second, I think it fairly clear from Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in
Seibert (and we must keep in mind that Kennedy cast the decisive vote) that even
when the police deliberately withhold the Miranda warnings, the derivative
evidence might well be admissible if the police take certain "curative measures"
(although the curative powers of these suggested measures seem quite suspect),74
such as lengthening the break between the two questioning sessions or replacing
the officer who conducted the first questioning session with another. (Any one
curative step might suffice; the taking of several curative steps is quite likely to
permit the use of the second confession).
It is unclear whether the police can escape Seibert's proscription simply by
being careful not to confront the Mirandized suspect with the unwarned statement
she made earlier. But it is possible this one change from the Seibert facts might
suffice. The plurality opinion cautions that "[w]e do not hold that a formal
addendum warning that a previous statement could not be used would be sufficient
... to the point of rendering an ensuing statement admissible. 75 But concurring
Justice Kennedy dwells on the fact that because the interrogating officer
confronted the defendant with her earlier unwarned statements, the postwarning
questioning session "resembled a cross-examination. ' '76 Kennedy also observes
that the officer's reference to the prewarning statement "shows the temptations for
abuse inherent in the two-step technique.""
An addendum warning that a previous statement may not be used may not
suffice, but it will certainly help. An addendum warning plus one curative step
might well be sufficient.
As for Patane, I believe the present Court would have let in the Glock pistol
(or any other physical fruits of a failure to comply with Miranda) even if the
officer had made a conscious decision to withhold the warnings. I think the most
73 Patane v. United States, 304 F.3d 1013, 1029 (10th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2620
(2004).
74 See supra text following note 62 for a discussion on the suspect nature of "curative
measures."
71 Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612 n.7.
76 Id. at 2615.
77 Id.
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plausible reading (albeit a painful one) of Justice Thomas's plurality opinion and
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion is that whether or not the officer's failure to
comply with the Miranda rule is deliberate, the physical fruits of a Miranda-
deficient statement are always admissible.
Four years ago, in Dickerson v. United States, the Court reaffirmed (perhaps
one should say revivified) the constitutional status of Miranda.78 But Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion of the Court did not really explain how its holding could be
reconciled with such cases as Elstad, which seemed to be based on the premise that
Miranda was not a constitutional decision. Indeed, Professor (now Judge) Paul
Cassell, who had been appointed by the Court to defend the federal statute, the
validity of which was at issue in Dickerson, charged that the Court's failure to
come to grips with cases like Elstad "leaves Miranda .. . incoherent., 79  And
Cassell was not alone.80
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Dickerson treated cases like Elstad very
gingerly. He did so probably because the language in those cases was very
difficult to reconcile with the holding in Dickerson, yet the Chief Justice wanted
Elstad and other cases that had carved out exceptions to Miranda to remain in
place. 81 But to say that Dickerson relied on cases like Elstad (as does the plurality
78 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
79 Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court's Failures in Dickerson, 99
MICH. L. REv. 898, 901 (2001). Continued Cassell:
Why can the "fruits" of Miranda violations be used against a defendant? The traditional
rule excludes fruits of, for example, unconstitutional searches. In Oregon v. Elstad, the
Court said very specifically that the reason for not following the Fourth Amendment rule
in the Miranda context was that "a simple failure to administer Miranda warnings is not
in itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment." The majority in Dickerson viewed these
statements not as "prov[ing] that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision" but rather that
"unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned
interrogation under the Fifth Amendment." Again, in its haste to dispose of the case, the
Court did not tarry to explain the difference.
Id. at 901-02.
80 See Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Miranda, Dickerson,
and the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 33 (2001) (asserting
that Dickerson neither repudiated Miranda nor the cases viewing Miranda's requirements as not
rights protected by the Constitution nor reconciled the two lines of precedent); Yale Kamisar,
Foreword: From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson to... ,99 MICH. L. REv. 879, 896 n.75 (2001)
("the Chief Justice made a feeble attempt to reconcile Elstad with the 'constitutionalized' Miranda
doctrine"); Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1030, 1071, 1075 (2002)
(the Dickerson Court "squandered an opportunity to rationalize contradictory case law regarding
Miranda's exceptions" and its attempt to explain why the "fruits doctrine developed in Fourth
Amendment cases does not apply to Miranda violations ... comes dangerously close to being a non
sequitur"); David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REv. 958 (2001)
("[i]t is not clear that [Dickerson] ever really answered" such central questions as "why has the
Supreme Court repeatedly said that the rights created by Miranda are 'not themselves rights protected
by the Constitution?"').
81 See Kamisar, supra note 80, at 893-94.
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opinion in Patane)82 or that Dickerson cited cases such as Elstad "in support" (as
does the concurring opinion in Patane)83 is surely to inflate what the Dickerson
opinion actually said.
Dickerson left precedents like Elstad undisturbed even though they seem to be
based on the wrong premise (in Elstad the notion that Miranda was not a
constitutional decision and therefore a violation of the Miranda rule was not
deserving of a "fruits" doctrine). But in Patane five members of the Court seem to
be telling us that cases like Elstad rested on the right premise after all (Miranda
really was a subconstitutional decision).
Dickerson spared Miranda the death penalty. But now that Patane is on the
books, it is not at all clear what else was accomplished by the reaffirmation (or
revivification) of Miranda's constitutional status. 84
Miranda dodged a bullet in Dickerson.85 Four years later, however, Miranda
took a bullet in the shoulder (Patane) and barely missed another one that would
have put it on life support.
Patane corroborates Donald Dripps's comment that the Dickerson opinion
was "intentionally written to say less rather than more, for the sake of achieving a
strong majority on the narrow question of Miranda's continued vitality. 86  As
Dickerson demonstrates, a large majority is unwilling to overrule Miranda (or to
let Congress do so). As Patane makes plain, however, a smaller majority is
unwilling to take Miranda very seriously.
82 See 124 S. Ct. at 2628 ("The [Dickerson] Court's reliance on our Miranda precedents,
including both Tucker and Elstad, further demonstrates the continuing validity of those decisions.").
83 See id. at 2631 ("I agree with the plurality that Dickerson did not undermine [such
precedents as Elstad] and, in fact, cited them in support.").
84 The anomalous thing about the three-person Patane plurality opinion is that Justice
Thomas, author of the opinion, and Justice Scalia, who joined the opinion, were the two dissenters in
Dickerson. As pointed out in The Supreme Court, 2003 Term, 118 HARV. L. REv. 296, 301 (2004)
(an excellent note that did not come to my attention until my article was in press):
The [Patane] plurality opinion characterized Miranda as a constitutionally based
prophylactic rule. This representation is somewhat surprising because Justice Scalia and
Thomas, when dissenting in Dickerson, had explicitly noted that the Court failed to
embrace this approach despite the strenuous arguments made for it [in Dickerson] by
both the petitioner and the United States. In fact, although the dissenters recognized that
this approach might have rendered Miranda jurisprudence coherent, they rejoiced in the
Court's failure to rely on it because, believing that such prophylaxis was an "immense
and frightening antidemocratic power [that] does not exist," they suggested that
"incoherence [might be] the lesser evil."
85 But see William J. Stuntz, Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REv. 975, 976 (2001):
"Dickerson represents not a bullet dodged but an opportunity missed. As things stand now, from
almost any plausible set of premises, police interrogation is badly regulated. Because of Dickerson, it
will continue to be badly regulated for a long time to come."
86 Dripps, supra note 80, at 3 (emphasis added).
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